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Abstract
We provide a theoretical link between the two most prominent ways of modeling
individual and collective contests as proposed by Tullock (1980) and Nitzan (1991)
respectively. By introducing Nitzan’s sharing rule as a way of modeling individual
contests we obtain a contest success function nesting a standard Tullock contest
and a fair lottery. We first provide an equivalence result between the proposed
contest and Tulllock’s contest for the two-player set-up. We then employ this
nested contest as a way of introducing noise in multi-player contests when in the
Tullock contest a closed form solution for the equilibrium in pure strategies does
not exist. We conclude by comparing the proposed contest with the existing ones
in the literature.
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In a contest individuals or groups exert costly effort in order to increase their chances of
winning a prize. One of the most famous and prolific ways of modeling individual contests
was introduced by Tullock (1980). Some years later, Nitzan (1991) focused on collective
action and significantly contributed to the literature by modeling contests among groups.
His particular interest was in alternative ways of allocating the contested prize among the
members of the winning group. While these seminal studies proposed alternative contest
designs that significantly contributed in the evolution of the individual and collective
contests literature, a theoretical link between these two strands is missing.
In this study we link these two models of individual and collective contests by intro-
ducing Nitzan’s sharing rule as a way of modeling individual contests with noise. This
approach leads to a contest nesting a standard Tullock contest and a fair lottery. Once
this nested contest is further transformed to a Tullock contest with transfers, we use the
results of Hillman and Riley (1989) and Stein (2002) to provide an equivalence result
for Tullock’s and Nitzan’s methods in a two-player contest. Moreover, and in contrast
to the standard Tullock contest, this nested contest guarantees a closed form solution in
pure strategies for the asymmetric N players contest that may be used in several applica-
tions. As we show, this solution significantly differs to the ones described in the literature
(Amegashie, 2006; Dasgupta and Nti, 1998). While the current mechanism is closer to
the one proposed by Tullock under different criteria of equivalence, the existing ones are
closer to the Tullock contest in terms of axiomatic properties.
Providing the theoretical link to the studies of Tullock (1980) and Nitzan (1991) and
proposing the use of a collective contest mechanism in individual contests is important
for a number of reasons. First, and most importantly, it is well known that under certain
conditions a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist for the Tullock (1980) contest.
We show that in such cases one can employ our results to consider a dual problem in
the Nitzan (1991)-equivalent collective contest in which an equilibrium in pure strategies
always exists. Second, our results will be of use for contest designers who look for optimum
mechanisms under constraints and can now implement a particular type of mechanism
that works the best. Third, Baye and Hoppe (2003) show that a Tullock contest can
represent various general situations other than only rent-seeking (as initially proposed by
Tullock, 1980) and provide relevant equivalence conditions. Hence, the link we establish
allows the application of our results in various areas of contests.
The rest of the paper progresses as follows. In Section 2 we provide the structure
of the analysis. We establish the link between the two types of contests in Section 3,
starting with the two-player case in Section 3.1 and extending our set-up to N -players in
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Section 3.2. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model set-up
2.1 Individual contests
Let N players compete for a prize of common value V by exerting non-negative levels of
effort. A contest success function (CSF), fi, maps the vector of efforts to the probability
that player i ∈ N wins the prize (i.e., fi : RN+ → [0, 1] such that
∑
i∈N fi(.) = 1).
Arguably, the most popular CSF is the one proposed by Tullock (1980), in which the
probability of player i winning the prize when exerting effort ei ≥ 0 is








erj > 0 and 1/N otherwise (r-CSF)
where ej denotes the effort exerted by player j and r ≥ 0 determines the noise level in the
contest. If r = 0 then the noise is maximum and players face a fair lottery. If r →∞ then
there is no noise and players compete under an all-pay auction in which the highest effort
wins with certainty. Let the cost functions be linear and ci > 0 denote the marginal cost
of player i. Without loss of generality, let ci be increasing in i, i.e., c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cN .






V − ciei (1)
2.2 Collective contests
In a collective contest several groups compete for a prize that has to be further allocated
to the N group members. If the prize is non-divisible, then group members also compete
in an intragroup contest (see, for example, Choi et al., 2015 and the references therein).
If the prize is divisible, then it is distributed among the group members following a
predetermined sharing rule. Arguably, the most famous sharing rule is the one proposed
1For the reasons of interpretability when we use Nitzan’s sharing rule in an individual contest, players’
heterogeneity is introduced through cost asymmetries. This is equivalent to asymmetries in terms of
valuations or in the effort impact (Gradstein, 1995; Corcho´n, 2007).
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by Nitzan (1991) where the share of the prize allocated to player i is given by2
fλi (e1, ..., eN) = λ
ei∑N
j=1 ej
+ (1− λ) 1
N
If λ ∈ [0, 1], as in most of the literature on collective contests, then a fraction λ of the
prize is allocated proportional to players’ effort. The remaining fraction of the prize is
allocated in an egalitarian manner across the N group members. Given that λ ∈ [0, 1],
it holds that fλi (e1, ..., eN) ∈ [0, 1] and the λ-CSF can be interpreted as a nested contest
that is a convex combination of the most common version of a Tullock CSF where r = 1
and of a fair lottery (i.e., r = 0).3 Note that λ can be interpreted as the degree of noise
(or meritocracy) in the competition and clearly resembles to the effect of r in the r-CSF.




+ (1− λ) 1
N
]V − ciei (2)
Note λ need not be restricted in the [0, 1] interval. However, when λ > 1 the proposed
function fλi may take values outside [0, 1] and therefore it can not be interpreted as a CSF
representing probabilities. If λ > 1 then the proposed sharing rule allows for transfers
among group members.4 For individual contests, this is similar to the idea proposed by
Appelbaum and Katz (1986) and Hillman and Riley (1989).
3 Link between the two contests




V˜ − ciei + (1− λ)V
N
(3)
where V˜ = λV . Hence the proposed nested contest is now transformed to a propor-
tional Tullock contest (i.e., r = 1) with an additional exogenous parameter (1− λ)V/N .
The exogenous parameter clearly does not affect the solution, and resembles a Tullock
contest with transfers (Hillman and Riley, 1989). Therefore, as long as λ > 0, solving the
2Nitzan (1991) was the first to use this sharing rule in modelling collective contests. This sharing
rule was previously introduced in the cooperative production literature by Sen (1966). For a survey on
sharing rules in collective rent-seeking see Flamand and Troumpounis (2015).
3Amegashie (2012) proposes a similar nested two-player contest that ranges from a Tullock to an
all-pay auction.
4For group contests allowing this possibility see, for example, Baik and Shogren (1995); Baik and Lee
(1997, 2001); Lee and Kang (1998); Gu¨rtler (2005); Balart et al. (2015).
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proposed nested contest is equivalent to solving the most tractable and therefore most
frequently implemented version of a Tullock contest (i.e., r = 1). Consequently, one can
follow Stein (2002) to solve the λ-contest and obtain the unique equilibrium (as shown
by Matros, 2006). Denoting individual prize valuations by Vi =
V˜
ci
, the equilibrium effort















where M is the number of active players. Player M is the highest marginal cost player






Given this link, in order to analyze the relationship between the λ and r-contests, we
first consider a two-player case in the next sub-section and then extend the analysis to
N players in Section 3.2. In the continuation, we make use of the definitions coined by
Chowdhury and Sheremeta (????) regarding equivalence of contests.
Definition 1. k
• Contests are effort equivalent if they result in the same equilibrium efforts.
• Contests are strategically equivalent if they result in the same best responses.
• Contests are payoff equivalent if in equilibrium they result in the same payoffs.
3.1 The two-player case
The two-player case is the most common in the literature since it allows one to provide
with closed form solutions, clear comparative statics and a graphical representation of the
results. Baik (1994) and Nti (1999) solved the two-player r-contest when an equilibrium
in pure strategies exists (Baye et al., 1994; Alcalde and Dahm, 2010; Ewerhart, 2014) for





(letting V1 ≤ V2 then r < 1 is a sufficient condition, while r < 2 is a necessary condition),
the two-player r-contest has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies where both players










with i 6= j, i = 1, 2 and Vi = V˜ci .
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By comparing the solutions of the λ and r-contest presented in equations (4) and (5)
as well as the best responses and the equilibrium payoffs in the two contests, the following
equivalence results arise.
Proposition 1. For any two-player r-contest with an equilibrium in pure strategies (i.e.,











2. There exists no strategically equivalent λ-contest (except for r = λ = 0 and r = λ =
1 when the two contests coincide).
3. There exists no payoff equivalent λ-contest (except for r = λ = 0, r = λ = 1 when
the two contests coincide and the symmetric case, c1 = c2).




Figure 1: Best response functions and effort equivalence on the left (r = 0.5 and
λ = 0.524729) and payoff equivalence on the right. For both graphs V1 = 20 and V2 = 12.
Figure 1 illustrates the result for asymmetric players. On the left, best responses are
different for the λ and r-contests but they intersect at the same effort equivalence point.
On the right panel, it is clear that the value of λ that guarantees payoff equivalence for
player 1 only coincides with that providing payoff equivalence for player 2 when the two
contests coincide (i.e., r = λ = 1 and r = λ = 0).
For the symmetric case, effort equivalence is obtained when λ = r. This also translates
into payoff equivalence.
By means of comparative statics we can describe several interesting equilibrium prop-
erties of the two-player λ-contest and compare them with those of the r-contest:
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Proposition 2. In the two-player λ-contest equilibrium:
1. A unique equilibrium in pure strategies exists for any λ.
2. Aggregate equilibrium effort is increasing in λ.
3. Aggregate equilibrium effort is decreasing in the players’ asymmetry.
Proof: See the appendix.
The first two properties substantially differ between the two contests. First, an equi-
librium in pure-strategies always exists in the λ-contest, while this is only true for certain
parametric restrictions in the r-contest. This difference is attributed to the fact that while
zero effort guarantees a zero payoff in the r-contest, this is not true in the λ-contest. In
the λ-contest, zero effort may result in negative payoffs since losers have to make a trans-
fer to the winners (Hillman and Riley, 1989). These transfers in the λ-contest make the
condition ei ≥ 0 non-binding. This guarantees an interior solution, and consequently an
equilibrium in pure strategies always exists.
! !
!"#
Figure 2: Effort equivalence value of λ, given any r such that an equilibrium in pure




2 (with V1/V2 = 10).
Second, while in the r-contest the comparative statics of aggregate effort with respect
to r depend on the degree of asymmetry among the players, in the λ-contest the level
of aggregate effort is strictly increasing in λ. As a consequence, the value of λ that
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guarantees an effort equivalent λ-contest, is not monotonic in r (Figure 2).5 Finally, the
third property linking the asymmetry with aggregate equilibrium effort is in line with the
standard result of the r-contest (Nti, 1999).
Before proceeding further, let us focus on an important difference between the λ and r-
contests. A well known feature of the r-contest is that it satisfies participation constraint,
namely players having a non-negative expected utility in equilibrium. Recall that in the
effort equivalent λ-contest the presence of transfers as in Hillman and Riley (1989) may
be required (i.e., λ > 1, as in Figure 2 for r belonging to [0.41, 1]). These transfers in
turn may violate individuals’ participation constraint, as it always happens in their setup.
While any competition involving a policy change with “winners” and “losers” does not
entail voluntarily participation and hence the participation constraint does not apply,
the latter is crucial in situations where agents compete for preexisting rents (Hillman
and Riley, 1989). Overall, while the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for any
level of noise is a desirable characteristic of the λ-contest compared to the r-contest,
the possible violation of the participation constraint by the λ-contest may challenge its
implementability under some particular settings.
Remark 1. In any λ-contest the participation constraint is satisfied if and only if
λ ≤ (V1 + V2)
2
V 21 + 2V1V2 − V 22












V 21 + 2V1V2 − V 22
As the first inequality describes, as long as λ is low, meaning that either no transfers
are involved (i.e., λ ≤ 1) or transfers are present but are not too punishing for low
contributors, all individuals will obtain a non-negative payoff in equilibrium and hence
the participation constraint is satisfied. Once the transfers become high enough (i.e.,
λ > (V1+V2)
2
V 21 +2V1V2−V 22 ), then low contributors are severely punished and therefore are better
off not participating in the contest.6 The conditions under which the λ-equivalent contest
5Note that, even for r < 1, the level of λ that ensures effort equivalence between the two contests
might involve transfers as in Hillman and Riley (1989). This depends on the exact level of asymmetry.
6This remark follows immediately when guaranteeing non-negative expected utility for player 2 and
isolating λ. Since V1 > V2 the same condition also guarantees that the expected utility of the highest
valuation player is also non-negative. Notice that participation constraint means not participating in
the contest with transfers whatsoever, and is different to an individual being inactive and exerting zero
effort. Zero effort is allowed in the solution of the λ-contest as presented in (4), but the presence of

















Figure 3: Effort equivalence value of λ and participation constraint.
does not satisfy the participation constraint depends on the specific combination of cost
asymmetry and noise level.
In the two upper panels of Figure 3, we provide a graphical representation of two
different scenarios regarding the satisfaction of the participation constraint. The lower
horizontal line at value 1 reminds the reader that above this value the λ equivalent
effort contest requires the presence of transfers. The upper horizontal line of these two
first panels, represents the upper bound on the values of λ for which the participation
constraint is satisfied. In the left upper panel, for a low level of asymmetry such that
V2 = 3V1, for any r we can find an equivalent λ-contest that satisfies the participation
constraint, even if the latter requires some transfers. In contrast, in the right upper panel,
we observe how the effort equivalent λ-contest violates the participation constraint for
some values of r when the level of asymmetry is high enough such that V2 = 9V1.
The darkest area in the lower panel plots the combinations of asymmetry V1/V2 and
r for which the effort equivalent λ-contest does not satisfy the participation constraint.
While the equivalent λ-contest satisfies the participation constraint for any level of r
when players asymmetry is low, for higher levels of asymmetry the region of r’s for which
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an equivalent λ-contest satisfies the participation constraint shrinks.
3.2 Extension to N players
Well known difficulties, in terms of non-existence of a closed form solution for the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, arise while extending the r-contest to set-ups with more than
two heterogeneous players and r 6= 1. In contrast, the biggest advantage of employing a
λ-contest is that closed form solutions are still obtained by expression (4). Given that for
values of λ ∈ [0, 1] no transfers are involved, parameter λ can be interpreted as a measure
of the noise level. Hence, when the effect of noise is of interest one can employ the λ-CSF
as a way of modelling contests with more than two asymmetric players. The following
proposition summarizes the properties of the λ-contest with more than two-players.
Proposition 3. In any N-player λ-contest with N > 2:
1. A unique pure strategy equilibrium with a closed form solution, given by (4), exists.
2. In equilibrium individual and aggregate equilibrium effort are increasing in λ.
3. A strategically or effort equivalent r-contest may not exist (except for r = λ = 0
and r = λ = 1 when the two contests coincide).
Proof: See the appendix.
Representing and solving the N -player asymmetric contests with non-proportional
noise level (i.e., r 6= 1) in a tractable way constitutes an important advantage of the
λ-contest. Another alternative in this area was proposed by Amegashie (2006) while
proposing a CSF with tractable noise parameter. He employed the structure of Dasgupta
and Nti (1998) in which they propose the α-CSF:
fαi (e1, ..., eN) =
ei + α∑N
j=1 ej +Nα
where α > 0 is the introduced “tractable” noise level parameter. The higher α is, the
more noise is introduced, with the case of α→∞ representing a fair lottery (r = 0 for a
Tullock CSF and λ = 0 for the nested contest presented above).
Note that the α-contest and the λ-contest coincide for the pairs (α → ∞, λ = 0)
and (α = 0, λ = 1). Therefore the λ-contest without transfers (i.e., λ ∈ [0, 1]) can
represent the same levels of noise as the α-contest.7 As it turns out the α-contest and the
7Fu and Lu (2007) show that the three types of contests considered here are strategically equivalent to
a noisy ranking contest with a type I extreme-value (maximum) distributed noise. However, a different
production technology of effort, g(ei) is associated with each type of contest. In particular, g(ei) = eri
in the r-contest, g(ei) = ei in the λ-contest and g(ei) = ei + α in the α-contest.
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λ-contest are never effort equivalent for such intermediate levels of noise (i.e., λ ∈ (0, 1)
and α ∈ (0,∞)). In the following corollary we highlight the main differences that arise
in terms of equilibrium results.
Corollary 1. .
• For N = 2 there exists a λ such that the λ-contest is effort equivalent to an r-
contest for any r that guarantees an equilibrium in pure strategies (Proposition 1).
An α-contest is never effort equivalent to an r-contest.
• For N > 2 and symmetric players there exists a λ such that the λ-contest is effort
equivalent to an r-contest for any r that guarantees an equilibrium in pure strategies
(Proposition 3). In the α-contest this is only true for r ∈ [0, 1].
• In an N-symmetric-players contest adding an additional player increases total effort
in the r-contest with an equilibrium in pure strategies and in the λ-contest while it
may decrease total effort in the α-contest.
• The λ-contest and r-contest can not sustain an equilibrium where all players are
inactive while this may occur in the α-contest.
The statements in Corollary 1 arise directly from Proposition 1 and 3 and Amegashie
(2006). Amegashie (2006) also discusses the axiomatic properties satisfied by his proposal
compared to the ones of Tullock (1980) as provided by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and
Riis (1998). For our proposal and when the λ-contest represents a contest success function
(i.e., λ ∈ [0, 1]) the following characteristics are of interest.
1. As Clark and Riis (1998) show the axioms of imperfect discrimination (A1), mono-
tonicity (A2), Luce’s axiom (A4’) and homogeneity of degree zero (A6) hold if and






j where r > 0 and ai, aj > 0 are constants (i.e.,
an augmented version of the r-CSF). While the axioms of imperfect discrimination
and monotonicity are satisfied both by the λ- and α-CSF, Luce’s axiom is satisfied
only by the α-CSF and homogeneity of degree zero is satisfied only by the λ-CSF.
2. Both for the λ- and α-CSF and in contrast to the r-CSF, (i) it does not hold that
if ei = 0 for any player i then the probability of winning the price is zero; and (ii)
these functions are continuous at ei = ej = 0 for all i 6= j.
In terms of axiomatic properties the λ-CSF does not satisfy Luce’s axiom while it
satisfies homogeneity of degree zero. Whereas, the α-CSF satisfies Luce’s axiom, but it
does not satisfy homogeneity of degree zero. Hence, while in terms of equilibrium results
the λ-contest is closer to the results of an r-contest than the ones of an α-contest, the
latter performs better than the λ-CSF in terms of axiomatic properties.
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4 Discussion
In this study we provide with a theoretical link between the individual contest (Tullock,
1980) and the collective contest (Nitzan, 1991); and derive the sufficient conditions for
effort equivalence among the two. Since an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists
with a collective contest framework, this link allows one to to implement the same as an
appropriate mechanism for N -asymmetric-players individual contests. We further provide
the relationship with the contest proposed by Amegashie (2006) in solving the same issue.
The λ-CSF we propose can be implemented in applications where the absence of
closed form solutions induces focus only on r = 1. Franke (2012), for instance, analyzes
the effect of affirmative action policies on aggregate effort. While in the two-player case
different noise level is allowed, the analysis is restricted to r = 1 for the N -players
contest. By considering the λ-CSF one can generalize the results to investigate whether
the affirmative action condition to maximize effort are also true for lower levels of noise.
A typical feature of the λ-CSF is that exerting zero-effort does not necessarily result
in a zero payoff. A similar result is obtained in multi-winner contests for which a noisy
winner selection mechanism is implemented (Berry, 1993; Chowdhury and Kim, 2014).
That is because in these multi-winner contests only one prize is allocated through the
effort outlays whereas others are allocated randomly - which resembles the nested prize
allocation feature of the λ-CSF. It would be of much interest to understand and analyze
the links between these two types of contest mechanisms.
The λ-CSF can also be of interest for experimental work and the effort equivalence
result can be tested. Since λ ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as noise, one can study the
effect of the latter on individual behavior (Millner and Pratt, 1989). The attractiveness
of the λ-CSF comes from the intuitive manner it can be introduced in the laboratory.
Experimenters could split (1 − λ) fraction of the prize in an egalitarian manner and let
subjects compete for the remaining part λ through a standard Tullock contest.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
1. When N = 2 the condition for a player being active active in the λ-contest is always
satisfied. From (4) the equilibrium effort of player i is ei =
V 2i Vjλ
(V1+V2)2
for i = 1, 2,
j 6= i. To prove effort equivalence we just need to equalize these equilibrium efforts
with the ones of the r-contest as presented in expression (5). Equilibrium efforts of






2. Note that when r = λ = 0 or r = λ = 1 the λ-contest and the r-contest coincide,
hence strategic equivalence follows immediately in these cases. The best response for




ejViλ} while it is not
possible to find a closed form solution for the best response of the r-contest. How-
ever, as shown in Chowdhury and Sheremeta (????) effort equivalence is a necessary
condition for strategic equivalence. Therefore, strategic equivalence is guaranteed
only if the first order conditions of the r-contest are satisfied for any value of ej




















is not true for all values of ej (only for the equilibrium one).
3. By plugin equilibrium efforts in the payoff of player 1 we obtain that the λ-contest
induces the same payoff as the one in the r-contest for λ =
(V1+V2)2(V 2r1 −V 2r2 −2r(V1V2)r)
(V 21 −2V1V2−V 22 )(V r1 +V r2 )2 =
λ1. Similarly, the λ-contest induces payoff equivalence for player 2 if and only if
λ =
(V1+V2)2(V 2r1 −V 2r2 +2r(V1V2)r)
(V 21 +2V1V2−V 22 )(V r1 +V r2 )2 = λ2. Normalizing V2 = 1 and V1/V2 = v we see that
λ1 = λ2, i.e., payoff equivalence, is only obtained for V1 = V2 or r = {0, 1} (when
the two contests coincide).
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
1. The existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies for any λ arises directly from the
conditions in Nti (1999). Uniqueness is shown in Matros (2006).
2. Total effort in the λ-contest is V1V2λ
V1+V2
. Consequently, aggregate equilibrium effort is
increasing in λ.
3. Assuming without loss of generality that V1 ≥ V2 and by normalizing V1 = 1 and
v = V2/V1 ∈ [0, 1], we obtain that the derivative of total effort with respect to v is
λ
(1+v)2
> 0, therefore aggregate equilibrium effort is strictly increasing in symmetry.
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5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Parts 1 and 2 of the proposition arise directly from (4) and the arguments presented by
Stein (2002). For part 3 if an effort equivalent λ-contest exists then we should be able to
find a relationship between λ and r such that the first order conditions of all active players
in the r-contest are satisfied by the equilibrium expressions in the λ-contest. However,
we can show that this is not true with a counterexample. Assume that V1 = 4, V2 = 3
and V3 = 2. Then, λ = 0.8046 guarantees that the first order condition of player 1 in the
r-contest is satisfied. However, this value of λ does not satisfy the first order conditions
of players 2 and 3 in the r-contest. As effort equivalence is not guaranteed, strategic
equivalence is neither. When r = λ = 0 or r = λ = 1 the λ-contest and the r-contest
coincide, hence strategic and effort equivalence follows immediately in these cases.
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